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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16372 
ROGER ANDERSON and THOMAS E. 
BRACKENBURY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 
TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT 
Respondent agrees with appellant Anderson's statement 
of the facts contained in the introduction of his brief on 
rehearing excluding the final paragraph of said introduction 
at page 2 of his brief. 
POINT I 
ADMISSION OF THE SWORN AFFIDAVIT OF A 
WITNESS NOT PRESENT AT THE PRELIMINARY 
HEARING WAS HARMLESS ERROR. 
At the appellant's preliminary hearing, the State 
submitted as evidence the sworn affidavit of Ray Applegate, 
a witness residing in Oklahoma. The court admitted this 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
evidence under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19 
(1953), as amended which allows the admission of hearsay 
evidence "if the Court determines that it would impose an 
unreasonable burden on one of the parties or on a witness 
to require that the primary source of the evidence be product 
at the hearing 
This court found that admission of the hearsay 
evidence was error since it "would seriously curtail the 
appellant's ability to present an affirmative defense at the 
preliminary hearing by denying him the protections provided 
by the confrontation of witnesses against him." (Majority 
opinion, p.11). However, this court concluded that any error 
was harmless since the remaining evidence was sufficient to 
show probable cause to bind the appellant over for trial. 
(Majority opinion, p.12). 
Respondent submits that this court's finding that 
any error in admitting the affidavit was harmless should be 
affirmed for the following reasons: 
A 
ANY ERROR IN ADMITTING 
THE AFFIDAVIT WAS HARMLESS 
SINCE THERE WAS A SUFFICIENT 
SHOWING OF PROBABLE CAUSE 
WITHOUT THE EVIDENCE CONTAINED 
IN THE AFFIDAVIT. 
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is to establi' 
probable cause to bind over the accused for trial. Thus, t.r· 
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State's burden at the hearing is "to convince a committing 
magistrate that the crime charged has been committed and 
that there is sufficient cause to believe the defendant 
committed it." Seibold v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 165, 435 P.2d 
289, 290-1 (1967). Recognizing the limited purpose of the 
preliminary hearing, this court noted that "the probable 
cause showing must establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant from which the trier of fact could conclude the 
defendant was guilty of the offense charged." (Majority 
opinion p.6). In order to establish a prima facie case, 
the State must present evidence on each statutory element of 
the offense charged. State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 217 
(Utah 1976). 
The appellant was charged with witness tampering 
under the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-508 (1953), 
as amended. This section reads, in part: 
A person is guilty of a felony of the third 
degree if: 
(1) Believing that an official proceeding or 
investigation is pending or about to be 
instituted, he attempts to induce or other-
wise cause a person to: 
(a) Testify or inform falsely. 
The respondent submits that all statutory elements 
of the crime of witness tampering were established by prima 
facie evidence at the preliminary hearing. First, the 
-3-
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testimony presented at the preliminary hearing showed that 
the appellant believed an official proceeding or investigatio~ 
was pending. Irvine J. Curtis, a former police officer for 
Soldier Summit, stated that he arrested Jim Garner at the 
request of appellant (Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p.37). 
Furthermore, appellant's position as Chief of Police of 
Soldier Summit would necessarily make him aware of any 
proceedings being instituted. The seconde element of the 
offense, attempting to induce or cause another person to 
testify falsely, is also established by the Curtis testimony. 
Curtis recounted two conversations with appellant and Tom 
Brackenbury in which they discussed the method used to 
obtain a statement from Ray Applegate to the effect that 
Garner had sold him liquor over the bar. (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript, p. 38-39). The testimony concerning the 
first of these conversations reads, in relevant part: 
. He said, "I got a statement of him 
[Garner] selling alcohol over the bar," 
and I said, "How did you get that?" He 
said, "Well, I got it from Applegate, a 
truck driver, a drunk truck driver." He 
made the statement that he slapped him 
around real good, bragging about the fact 
that he had slapped him around to get the 
statement. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript p.38). 
This testimony clearly established that the appellant attemp~' 
to obtain and succeeded in obtaining statements from Ray ApF~' 1 
-4-
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through force. The final element of the crime is the 
falsity of the statements obtained from the witness. 
Evidence of falsity is shown by a comparison of the 
testimony of Jim Garner at the preliminary hearing as 
to what happened in the J & M Saloon on May 28, 1978 
and the statement of Ray Applegate concerning the events 
of the same evening. (States Exhibit #1). Garner testified 
that Applegate did not purchase liquor from him (Preliminary 
Hearing Transcript p.49) nor did he purchase liquor from 
his wife for fifty cents a shot. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript pp. 50, 53). However, in the statement made by 
Applegate and witnessed by the appellant, Justice of the 
Peace Tom Brackenbury and Mayor George Schade, Applegate 
claims to have purchased alcohol from Garner and his wife 
at fifty cents a shot. Respondent submits that the testimony 
of these witnesses in conjunction with the false statements 
made by Applegate was sufficient to establish a prima facie 
case of witness tampering and establish sufficient cause 
to believe appellant committed the offense charged. 
The appellant argues that the false statements 
made by Applegate cannot be considered in determining probable 
cause since the foundation for admission of these statements 
~as the hearsay affidavit determined to be inadmissible by 
this court. Respondent contends that the appellant should 
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not be allowed to raise this objection for the first time 
in his petition for rehearing. The admission of these 
documents was not specifically objected to when they were 
offered at the preliminary hearing nor at any time since. 
It is a well-established principle that failure to raise 
a timely objection constitutes a waiver and estops a party 
from raising the objection for the first time on appeal. 
Sanders v. Cassity, 586 P.2d 423 (Utah 1978). 
The respondent asserts that the evidence presented 
at the preliminary hearing was sufficient, notwithstanding 
the exclusion of the hearsay evidence, to fulfill the State's 
burden of showing probable cause. Respondent further claims 
that since the state fulfilled its burden at the prelimina~ 
hearing, no prejudicial error resulted from admission of 
the hearsay evidence. 
B 
THE ADMISSION OF THE 
AFFIDAVIT WAS HARMLESS ERROR, 
SINCE THERE WAS NO REASONABLE 
LIKELIHOOD THAT THE RESULT 
WOULD HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT IF 
THIS EVIDENCE HAD BEEN EXCLUDED. 
The standard of review for prejudicial error 
established by Utah case law is a determination whether the~ · 
is a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been 
different in the absence of error. A concise statement of 
this principle appeared in State v. Eaton, 569 P.2d 1114 
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(Utah 1977) where this court stated: 
. . the rule which we have numerous 
times stated is that if the error is 
such as to justify a belief that it 
had a substantial adverse effect upon 
the defendant's right to a fair trial, 
in that there is a reasonable likelihood 
that in its absence there may have been 
a different result, then the error should 
not be regarded as harmless; and conversely, 
if the error is such that it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was 
harmless in that the result would have 
been the same, then the error should not 
be deemed prejudicial .. 
569 P.2d at 1116. See also, State v. Kazda, 540 P.2d 949 
(Utah 1975); State v. Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975). 
Any error in admitting the affidavit of Ray Applegate 
in lieu of his personal testimony at the preliminary hearing 
was harmless under this test since there is no likelihood 
of a different result in absence of the error. First, 
sufficient cause to bind the appellant over for trial was 
shown by evidence not contained in the affidavit. Second, 
if the affidavit had not been admitted, probable cause would 
have been established by the personal testimony of the 
witness. Accordingly, the court made provisions at the 
preliminary hearing that, should the affidavit be determined 
to be inadmissible, the proceeding would be continued until 
Applegate could testify in person. (Preliminary Hearing 
Transcript p.17). In absence of such a provision, the State 
could have refiled charges if exclusion of the affidavit 
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resulted in a determination that probable cause was not 
shown. Therefore, respondent submits that there is no 
reasonable likelihood of a different result in absence of 
error, since if the affidavit had not been admitted, the 
State would have made arrangements, at considerable expense, 
to have Applegate present at the preliminary hearing. 
The appellant further contends that since he 
was not able to cross-examine the witness at the prelimina~ 
hearing, he was denied discovery opportunities which 
hindered his ability to prepare a meaningful defense. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.6). Respondent wishes to point out 
that this argument must be placed in the proper perspective. 
Recognizing the right of the accused to confront witnesses 
at the preliminary hearing does not create a right to 
discovery at the preliminary hearing. See, State v. Prevost, 
188 Ariz. 100, 574 P.2d 1319 (1977); Rex v. Sullivan, 575 
P.2d 408 (Colo. 1978); McDonald v. Dist. Court In and For 
Fourth Judicial District, 576 P.2d 169 (Colo. 1978); ~ 
v. United States, 476 F.2d 26 (10th Cir. 1973). The disc~c 
opportunity afforded the appellant at the preliminary hear~ 
is in issue only as it relates to appellant's right to a 
fair trial, and the majority opinion does not support an 
independent right to discovery at the preliminary hearing. 
(Majority opinion p.11). On the contrary, the opinion 
-8-
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recognizes that discovery opportunities are "ancillary 
benefits" of the preliminary proceeding. (Majority opinion 
p.11). Thus, Justice Maughn clearly delineated the scope 
of the right of confrontation: 
recognition of the right of 
confrontation at the preliminary 
examination does not change the 
character of that proceeding. It 
must still retain its preliminary 
nature and is not to be considered 
a full trial on the merits. The 
prosecution is not required to 
introduce its entire case at the 
hearing but, rather, need only 
introduce that quantum of evidence 
necessary to surmount their burden 
of proving probable cause. The 
recognition of the right of con-
frontation at the preliminary 
hearing merely demands the pros-
ecution's use of hearsay evidence 
at the hearing may not circumvent 
the defendant's substantive rights 
to a fair hearing and fair trial, by 
denying the defendant an opportunity 
to cross-examine the witnesses who 
offer testimony at the hearing. 
(Majority opinion, p.12). 
The respondent asserts that no "right to discovery" 
was denied appellant by introduction of the sworn affidavit 
at the hearing. The opportunity for discovery is merely a 
benefit incidental to the limited right of confrontation in 
the preliminary hearing. The State sustained its only burden 
at the hearing by presenting sufficient evidence in addition 
to the affidavit to establish probable cause to bind the 
appellant over for trial. Furthermore, every effort was 
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made to ensure that the fact Ray Applegate did not personall; 
testify would have only a minimal effect on the defendant. 
Accordingly, the magistrate accepted the State's motion to 
admit the hearsay evidence pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-_i 
(1953), as amended, with the understanding that if the motior. 
were denied, and the hearsay not admitted, the preliminary 
hearing would be continued until the witness could be present. 
(Preliminary Hearing Transcript, p.17). In addition, the 
Court made arrangements with the prosecutor on the record 
to have Applegate available one day prior to trial. 
I 
( Prelimi':: 
Hearing Transcript, p. 19) . The appellant's ability to prepare I 
I 
a meaningful defense was not hindered by the admission of 
this hearsay evidence to the extent that his right to a fair 
trial was affected. Thus, respondent submits that there is 
no likelihood that, in absence of any error in admitting 
this evidence, the result of the preliminary hearing or trial 
would have been any different. 
Appellant cites the cases of Chapman v. California, 
386 u.s. 18, 87 s.ct. 824, 17 L.Ed 2d 705 (1967) and State 1'·' 
Scandrett, 24 Utah 2d 202, 468 P.2d 639 (1970) in support of 
the contention that before a constitutional error can be 
held harmless, it must be proven to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Respondent submits that these cases do 
not assert a standard for determining error any more strin~: 
-10-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
than the "reasonable likelihood of a different result" 
test well established in the Utah case law discussed supra. 
Chapman treated the effect of highly prejudicial comments 
by opposing counsel in the presence of the jury concerning 
the accused's failure to testify. The appellant creates 
the impression that the Court in that case placed the 
burden of proving an error to be non-prejudicial upon the 
State when, in fact, the Supreme Court merely held that 
. before a federal constitutional error can be held 
harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that 
it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 386 U.S. at 24. 
Respondent submits that finding an error harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt and concluding that there is no reasonable 
likelihood that, in the absence of error, the result would 
be different are converse statements of the same standard. 
Accordingly, this court has often expressed the standard in 
the alternative,as in the following language from State v. 
Howard, 544 P.2d 466 (Utah 1975): 
. . if upon looking at the whole 
evidence, it appears beyond a rea-
sonable doubt that there is no 
substantial likelihood that the 
verdict would have been different 
in the absence of the error, it 
should be disregarded. But the 
reverse proposition is also true: 
that if there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of 
the error, there would have been a 
different result, the error should 
be regarded as prejudicial. (Emphasis 
added). 
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554 P.2d at 469. See also State v. Eaton, supra. 
The Scandrett case, similarly, merely re-states 
the standard for reversible error established in Utah 
case law and does not place a burden upon the State to 
show each and every error to be harmless beyond a 
reasonable doubt. This Court in Scandrett rejected the 
view that any violation of a constitutional right is 
prejudicial per se, concluding that although "there 
is a presumption that such error is prejudicial," "it can be 
overcome when the court is convinced beyond a reasonable 
doubt that it had no such prejudicial effect upon the 
proceedings." (Emphasis added.) 468 P.2d at 643. Responden:~ 
points out that the other cases cited by appellant as support:· 
its depiction of the test for harmless error also re-state 
the "reasonable likelihood" test. Respondent has already 
shown that any error in the present case is harmless under 
this standard since there is no reasonable likelihood that, 
had the hearsay evidence been excluded, the result at the 
hearing or the trial would have been any different and, 
conversely, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
error could have no prejudicial effect upon the appellant's 
right to a fair trial. 
-12-
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POINT II 
THE COURT SHOULD RECONSIDER ITS DETER-
MINATION THAT THE ADMISSION OF HEARSAY 
EVIDENCE AT THE PRELIMINARY HEARING 
CONSTITUTED ERROR. 
Respondent respectfully urges this court to 
reconsider its conclusion on appeal that the introduction 
of hearsay evidence at the preliminary hearing was constitu-
tional error. Respondent submits that it was unnecessary 
to implicate the constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-15-19 or to hold that an accused has a constitutional 
right to confront every material witness who is the source 
of evidence offered at the preliminary hearing. 
The United States Constitution does not give the 
accused a right to a preliminary hearing. See United States 
ex rel Kassin v. Mulligan, 295 U.S. 396, 53 S.Ct. 781, 79 
L.Ed. 1501 (1935); Beck v. Washington, 369 U.S. 541, 82 S.Ct. 
955, 8 L.Ed.2d 98 (1962). However, the Supreme Court has 
held certain Sixth Amendment rights must be guaranteed to 
an accused before trial at critical stages in the process of 
criminal prosecution. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 
845, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 
90 S.Ct. 1999, 26 L.Ed.2d 387 (1969). The Supreme Court 
"has identified as 'critical stages' those pretrial procedures 
that would impair defense on the merits if the accused is 
-13-
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required to proceed without counsel." Gerstein v. Pugh, 
supra, 420 U.S. at 122. Hence, the Fourth Amendment 
determination of probable cause to detain an individual, 
the situation in Gerstein, was not a critical stage 
requiring assistanceof counsel, while the determination 
of probable cause to bind an accused over for trial, the 
situation in Coleman, was a critical stage of the proceeding 
requiring assistance of counsel. Although both cases 
involved a determination of "probable cause," the procedural 
safeguards differ. Myers v. Commonwealth, 363 Mass. 843, 
2 9 8 N. E. 2d 819 , 8 2 3, 8 2 4 ( 19 7 3) . 
These Supreme Court cases rest upon an analysis 
of the various stages of the criminal proceeding to determine ' 
when Sixth Amendment rights must be protected against possible 
prejudice. However, the Supreme Court has always made an 
effort to balance the accused's interest against the State's 
interest at each stage of the process. Gerstein v. Pugh, 
cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 
L.Ed. 2d 484 (1972) ("[I] t is a recognition that not all 
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the 
same kind of procedure." 400 U.S. at 481). 
The Supreme Court has yet to hold that the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation is absolutely applicable 
to any criminal proceeding other than the actual trial. 
-14-
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L 
"The right to confrontation is basically a trial right." 
Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725 (1968). Thus far, the 
Supreme Court has determined that the right to effective 
assistance of counsel, the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses testifying at the hearing and the right 
of the defense to call its own witnesses are sufficient to 
protect the accused's right to a fair trial in critical 
pre-trial proceedings. 
It is only at the trial stage, where accused's 
guilt or innocence is determined, that the Court has 
granted the accused the right to confront all witnesses 
presenting evidence. As the Supreme Court observed in 
Berger v. California, 393 U.S. 314, 89 S.Ct. 540, 21 L.Ed.2d 
500 (1969), one of the objectives of the right to confrontation 
at trial is to guarantee that the ultimate fact finder who 
determines guilt or innocence has an adequate opportunity 
to assess the credibility of witnesses. This is echoed by 
other courts, eg., Haggard v. State, 475 S.W.2d 186, 187 
(Tenn. 1971), "The 'confrontation' guaranteed by the United 
States Constitution is confrontation at trial. [Absence of 
the accused when a statement is made] is immaterial on a 
confrontation question so long as the [witness] can be cross-
examined on the witness stand at trial." Where an accused 
can confront and cross-examine a witness at trial, "there is 
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no Sixth Amendment requirement that [the accused) also be 
allowed to confront [the witness) at a preliminary hearing 
prior to trial." United States v. Harris, 458 F.2d 670, 
677 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 409 U.S. 888, 93 S.Ct. 195, 
34 L.Ed. 2d 145 (1972). 
The purpose of the preliminary hearing is to 
determine whether there is "probable cause" to bind the 
accused over for trial. Thus, the function of a preliminary 
hearing is similar to that of a grand jury proceeding. Ut~ 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 et seq., and Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-1 
et seq. Yet an accused at a grand jury proceeding has no 
right even to be present (unless called as a witness), 
Johnson v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 539 P.2d 
792 (Calif. 1975), and no right to cross-examine or confront 
witnesses against him. People v. Encinas, 3 Cal. Rptr. 624, 
186 C.A.2d 12 (1960); see State v. Salazar, 469 P.2d 157 
(N.M. 1970). Utah Code Ann. § 77-19-3 provides that a witnes; 
testifying before a grand jury has the right to counsel and 
the right not to incriminate himself, but the statute does 
not provide for confrontation and cross-examination of 
witnesses. i 
I 
At the preliminary hearing the accused has the sarrE I 
rights regarding counsel and self-incrimination. However, 
the accused has additional rights to be present when a wit~' 
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testifies and to cross-examine the witness, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-15-10; to present his own witnesses, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-15-11; supoenaed at his request, Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-11; 
and to require exclusion of persons from the proceeding, 
unless their presence is required by statute, Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-15-13. An additional safeguard inherent in the nature 
of the preliminary hearing is the requirement that the 
hearing take place before a magistrate rather than a jury 
of lay persons. 
The accused's rights are further protected by the 
fact that the preliminary hearing is governed by the rules 
of evidence for criminal cases. Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19(2). 
The only exception to the evidence rules is that hearsay 
may be admitted pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-15-19. 
However, this statute provides that hearsay may be used at 
the preliminary hearing only in the following circumstances: 
(2) . if the court determines that it 
would impose an unreasonable burden on one 
of the parties or on a witness to require 
that the primary source of the evidence 
be produced at the hearing, and if the 
witness or party furnishes information 
bearing on the informant's reliability 
and, as far as possible, the means by 
which the information was obtained. When 
hearsay evidence is admitted, the court, 
in determining the existence of sufficient 
cause, shall consider: 
(a) The extent to which the hearsay quality 
of the evidence affects the weight it should 
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be given, and 
(b) The likelihood of evidence other 
than hearsay being available at trial 
to provide the information furnished 
by hearsay at the preliminary examination. 
The use of hearsay at the preliminary hearing is thus severe: 
limited, requiring the magistrate to make several threshold 
determinations before admitting the evidence. 
As this court noted, "Only when the specific 
safeguard is necessary to effectuate the protection of a 
substantive right held by the accused will its application 
to the specific criminal proceeding be mandated." (Majority 
opinion, p. 5). Respondent submits that this Court's holding 
requiring confrontation of material witnesses presenting 
evidence at a preliminary hearing is not necessary to pro~ct 
the accused's right to a fair trial. An accused's rights 
and interests are sufficiently protected by the assistance 
of counsel and the procedural safeguards in the preliminacy 
hearing as noted above. The accused is not prevented from 
confronting witnesses if hearsay evidence is admitted since 
the accused himself may supeona the witness pursuant to Ut~ 
Code Ann. § 77-15-8. Furthermore, if the witness is not 
present at the preliminary hearing, the accused has the 
right to confront the witness at trial before the jury. 
Since the primary purpose of a preliminary hear~: 
is to determine if there is probable cause to bind the ace' 
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over for trial, respondent contends that Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-15-19 is well drafted and should not be limited in 
its application by requiring confrontation of all material 
witnesses. The statute authorizes the use of hearsay only 
if production of the primary source of evidence would be 
an unreasonable burden on a party or a witness. The court 
is also required to make several other threshold determinations, 
as noted above, before admitting the hearsay. The use of 
hearsay evidence in these limited circumstances does not 
infringe upon an accused's right to a fair trial. The 
safeguards already existing in the criminal process are 
sufficient to protect this right without requiring confronta-
tion of all witnesses at the preliminary hearing. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM ITS FINDINGS 
THAT APPELLANTS OTHER ARGUMENTS IN HIS 
INITIAL BRIEF ON APPEAL ARE WITHOUT 
MERIT. 
This court stated in the majority opinion that after 
consideration of appellant's other points on appeal, these 
points were found to be without merit. Respondent submits 
that this court's initial determination was correct and 
should not be disturbed. Respondent hereby incorporates by 
reference the arguments in opposition to appellant's contentions 
presented in respondent's initial brief on appeal. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondent submits that the recent decision by 
this court in State v. Anderson and Brackenbury, No. 16372, 
filed May 29, 1980, was correct and that a rehearing is not 
merited. Respondent prays that the present petition for 
rehearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT B. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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